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Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.

Supreme Court Deals a Blow to the Administrative State

The Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, its forty-year-old decision which has allowed administrative agencies to impose their regulatory will on industries, small businesses, and individuals by requiring that courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. According to EPA Administrator Regan, the decision “hits EPA extremely hard.”

In general terms, Chevron provides guidelines for a court to review an agency’s action pursuant to an act of Congress using a two-step framework. First, a court must assess whether Congress, in the statute, has spoken directly to the issue at hand and, if so, that is the end of the inquiry as the clear will and intent of Congress must be followed. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the agency action at issue, the court must, as the second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. As many statutes are silent or ambiguous as to an issue, Chevron allowed agencies to wield great power to act as long as the action was based on a permissible reading, even if the court did not necessarily agree with that reading.

In overruling Chevron, the Court relied on the intent of the Framers and its traditional role, finding that it has always been the province of the court to interpret the law. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 did not change this traditional role as the APA codified the traditional understanding that courts must decide all relevant questions of law. The Court stated: “The APA, in short, incorporates the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Chevron changed that approach. Instead of a court interpreting a statute and/or deciding relevant questions of law, an agency was allowed to provide a permissible reading of a statute and a reviewing court was required to defer to that reading. In the Court’s view, Chevron “defies the command of the APA” and “triggered a marked departure from the traditional approach.” As a result, Chevron had to be overruled.

But, what is left in its place? The Supreme Court was somewhat unclear. It did state that a court must find a “best reading” of a statute and answer “the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” To get to that ‘best reading,’ the Court provided some guidance.

First, a court may “seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes.” An agency interpretation “may constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Second, an interpretation “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Finally, a statute may provide some authority for an agency to “exercise a degree of discretion.”

The Court also referenced a decision older than Chevron and the APA, Skidmore v Swift, to provide some criteria for accepting an agency interpretation: The weight or deference provided to an agency “would ‘depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’”

Even if there is now some uncertainty in how to determine whether the statute authorizes the agency’s action, a court cannot simply defer to an agency’s reading of a statute as they have done in the decades since Chevron was decided. Instead, the court must interpret the law and owes little, if any, deference to the agency’s interpretation. As a result, an agency will be unable to issue regulations or take actions that go much beyond the relevant statute.